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INTRODUCTION
The disparate impact strand of antidiscrimination law provides the pos-
sibility of challenging harmful employment, education, housing, and other
public and private policies and practices without the often-difficult burden of
proving intentional discrimination. And yet the disparate impact standard
seems to be facing its own burdens. Rulings by the Supreme Court in recent
years have shaken the disparate impact standard's footing. In Ricci v. De-
Stefano,' the Court rejected a frontal assault to the disparate impact standard
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 but cast the standard as at
odds with Title VII's true core - its prohibition of intentional discrimina-
tion.3 In its 2001 decision in Alexander v. Sandoval,4 the Court refused to
allow private enforcement of the disparate impact regulations issued pursu-
ant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and though it assumed the
validity of these regulations, the Court noted their "considerable tension"
with the dictates of the statute. 6 Then, in May 2013, the Court granted certi-
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For excellent research assistance, I thank An-
drew Bruns, Lane Feler, Hannah Lepow, and Samuel Shepson, as well as Jennifer Wertkin of
the Columbia Law Library. For helpful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Gillian
Metzger and the editors of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review.
'557 U.S. 557 (2009).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
3 557 U.S. at 580-81.
4 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2006).
6 532 U.S. at 282 (assuming the validity of the disparate impact regulations under Title
VI).
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
orari on the validity of the federal courts' longstanding interpretation of the
Fair Housing Act ("FHA") to prohibit unjustified disparate impacts in Town-
ship of Mount Holly, New Jersey v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action,
Inc.' The Supreme Court appeared poised to decide the question, but the
case was settled by the parties shortly before oral argument.' The Supreme
Court has had past waves of skepticism about the doctrine. The Court's 1989
opinion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio9 made it harder for plaintiffs to
establish disparate impact claims;io congressional rejection of this decision
spurred the 1991 Civil Rights Act's codification of a burden-shifting stan-
dard for Title VII." Indeed, even commentators supportive of disparate im-
pact's inclusionary goals question the efficacy of the disparate impact
standardl2 and ask whether the standard detracts from the assumed more im-
portant goal of addressing intentional discrimination.'"
This Article argues that casting disparate impact as a disfavored, illegit-
imate, judicially created branch of antidiscrimination law fails to grapple
adequately with disparate impact's longstanding roots as a tool employed by
agencies to implement statutory antidiscrimination precepts. Nor does this
view fully appreciate the continuing role that federal administrative agencies
play in shaping the meaning of disparate impact today. Investigating the
role of agencies in shaping disparate impact has new urgency: the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") recently promulgated
regulations formalizing the FHA's disparate impact standard.14 The rule's
legality as well as its broader legitimacy crucially depend on one's view of
agencies' formal powers, expertise, and capacity to define and shape dispa-
7 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-18, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (U.S. June 11, 2012), 2012 WL 2151511; Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting
cert.).
8 Adam Liptak, Fair-Housing Case Is Settled Before It Reaches Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIES (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-be
fore-it-reaches-supreme-court.html, archived at http://perma.cc/09Dhz2wn6El; see also Order
Dismissing Writ of Certiorari, Mount Holly, No. 11-1507 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013), 2013 WL
6050174.
9 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
10 See id. at 659-60 (holding that the employer bears only the burden of production on the
question of business necessity, not the burden of persuasion); id. at 659 (replacing the business
necessity prong with the requirement that the practice "serve, in a significant way, the legiti-
mate goals of the employer" (emphasis added)).
" See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
12 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv.
701, 705 (2006) (arguing that "the disparate impact theory has produced no substantial social
change" outside of "written employment tests"); see generally Charles F. Abernathy, Legal
Realism and the Failure of the "Effects" Test, 94 GEO. L.J. 267 (2006) (arguing that the effects
test the Supreme Court developed under Title VI proved judicially unmanageable).
" See Selmi, supra note 12, at 781 (arguing "that the presence of the disparate impact
theory may have stunted the evolution of a more robust definition of intentional
discrimination").
14 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120, 100.130,
100.500).
126 [Vol. 49
The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact
rate impact. This rulemaking brings to the fore the role of civil rights and
federal agencies in shaping and interpreting disparate impact.
The new FHA regulations, I suggest, provide an occasion to examine
afresh the disparate impact standard's origins in agency lawmaking and prac-
tice. Understanding the role of agencies in developing and shaping disparate
impact standards has the potential to shore up the disparate impact standard's
seemingly shaky normative foundations in a number of key ways. For one,
including agencies in our account allows us to understand disparate impact
not as a separate offshoot of antidiscrimination law invented by courts, but
as a reasonable agency implementation choice given the potentially broad
and conflicting meanings of the antidiscrimination directive of civil rights
law. Agencies, not courts, first developed disparate impact under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and, under standard administrative deference principles,
agencies have authority to define the capacious term "discrimination" to
include disparate impact." In addition, agencies' implementation of dispa-
rate impact draws on their distinctive set of competencies relative to courts.
For instance, in the context of fair housing, HUD's promulgation of disparate
impact rules has the capacity to stabilize disparate impact law and to provide
clarity to regulated entities subject to different judicial standards. Disparate
impact's fate is intimately connected with civil rights' hybrid enforcement
regime - one that lodges implementation power not just in courts, but also
in agencies.
This Article's examination proceeds in three Parts. Part I considers the
contested nature of disparate impact in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,
with attention to Title VI and Title VII. Part II recounts the longstanding
agency role in developing and implementing disparate impact standards in
the context of Title VI and Title VII. Though the implementing agencies at
issue differ in their strength and capacity - the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") has limited regulatory authority to enforce
Title VIP6 - this Part reframes disparate impact as an implementation
choice of long vintage and one that both the statutory and regulatory struc-
ture of civil rights statutes allow. Part III introduces Title VIII's disparate
impact regulations. This Part argues that HUD's promulgation of a disparate
impact rule requires us to take seriously the notion that agencies have the
capacity to determine whether civil rights statutes reach disparate impact and
to develop the standards for implementing disparate impact rules. Next, this
Part considers the formal regulatory context that supports HUD's action -
specifically, its rulemaking power, and its adjudicatory power born of the
1988 Amendments that fundamentally reshaped HUD's authority under the
" See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984). As discussed below, deference will be strongest for those agencies with authority to
issue regulations with the force of law. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230
(2001).
16 See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
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FHA. This Part considers, finally, HUD's function and competence to define
disparate impact, showing how a disparate impact rule has the potential to
provide clarity and predictability to regulated actors.
I. EROSION
After the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Ricci v. DeStefano7 and
Alexander v. Sandoval," disparate impact's grounding seems shaky. In this
Part, I consider the effect of those rulings, which address disparate impact
under Title VII and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (prohibiting certain
forms of discrimination in employment and federally funded activities, re-
spectively). While I believe that the Court is unlikely to eviscerate the dis-
parate impact standard in the near future, its recent rulings have cast a
shadow over the standard. As this Part shows, these decisions reflect a
broader skepticism about the normative value and the provenance of dispa-
rate impact law.
In Ricci v. De Stefano, which arose out of a challenge to the promotion
practices of the New Haven, Connecticut Fire Department," the Court con-
fronted an apparent conflict between the disparate treatment and disparate
impact prohibitions of Title VII. 20 Title VII makes it unlawful for an em-
ployer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 2 1 The Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power2 2 interpreted the statute to allow claims of discrimina-
tion based on certain discriminatory effects.23 As a result of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,24 Title VII also includes a provision codifying the standard of
proof in disparate impact cases. 25 As codified, the disparate impact provi-
sions provide that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate im-
pact by showing that an employer uses "a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin." 26 In Ricci, the city claimed that it could not certify the
" 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
1 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
19 557 U.S. at 561-62 (providing account of the examination process).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (delineating employment prohibitions); id. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A) (specifying burden of proof in disparate impact cases).
21 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Act also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." See id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
22 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23 Id. at 429-36.
24 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
26 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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results of a promotion examination because to do so would have a disparate
impact on African American applicants.2 7 By contrast, the plaintiffs in the
case - one Hispanic and several white firefighters - challenged this re-
fusal as violating Title VII's disparate treatment provisions. 28
In its ruling, the Court concluded that the city's failure to certify the test
violated Title VII's prohibition on disparate treatment. In arriving at its
holding, the majority sought to "give effect" to both the disparate impact
and disparate treatment dimensions of the statute, rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument that an employer's actions to avoid disparate impact could never
justify disparate treatment.2 9 The Court then announced a new standard for
resolving the asserted statutory conflict between the disparate impact and
disparate treatment provisions of the Act. 0 Borrowing from prior constitu-
tional decisions specifying when government actors may make race-con-
scious decisions to remedy past racial discrimination,3 1 the Court required
employers first to establish "a strong basis in evidence" of disparate impact
liability.32 This "strong basis in evidence" standard requires that the em-
ployers make more than a prima facie showing of disparate impact.33
The effect of Ricci, then, was to preserve statutory disparate impact, but
to do so under a heightened standard ("strong basis in evidence") that may
be difficult for employers to establish in particular cases. In addition, mem-
bers of the Court majority called into question the stability of this compro-
mise in separate opinions. In particular, Justice Scalia, while joining the
majority opinion, argued that the decision "merely postpones the evil day on
which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what
extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protec-
tion?"34 In Justice Scalia's view, Ricci resolved the conflict between dispa-
rate impact and disparate treatment, but a larger war - between Equal
Protection and disparate impact - loomed.35
In examining Ricci, I do not propose to answer whether Ricci was cor-
rectly decided on statutory grounds or to take on Justice Scalia's challenge to
27 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562 (2009).
28 Id. at 575.
29 Id. at 580.
3 See id. at 582-83.
" See id. at 582 ("The Court has held that certain government actions to remedy past
racial discrimination - actions that are themselves based on race - are constitutional only
where there is a 'strong basis in evidence' that the remedial actions were necessary." (quoting
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989))).
32 Id.
33 See id. at 587 (concluding that "a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability -
essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, and nothing more - is far
from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it
certified the results" (citation omitted)).
3 Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35 See id. at 595-96 ("But the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be
waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how - and on what terms
- to make peace between them.").
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justify the disparate impact standard's constitutionality. The constitutional
arguments for disparate impact are well articulated in post-Ricci commen-
tary.36 Justice Ginsburg's dissent argued that the majority's "strong basis in
evidence" standard was vague and lacked a basis in the statutory language,
and she articulated some of the primary statutory interpretation arguments
against the majority's holding." For those interested in preserving Title VII's
disparate impact standard, the decision certainly could have been worse.
The Court explicitly affirmed the language and goals of Title VII's codified
disparate impact standard and made clear that employers could take "affirm-
ative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity" and could
design a test or practice to ensure a "fair opportunity for all individuals,
regardless of their race."38 In addition, a subsequent Court opinion unani-
mously endorsed a plaintiffs claim in a Title VII disparate impact case.39
Instead, I offer Ricci as evidence of the incrementally more fragile state of
disparate impact law, a standard clouded by suggestions that it may run afoul
of core norms of equal treatment and antidiscrimination that are embodied in
the statute.
A 2001 Supreme Court decision similarly cast a shadow over disparate
impact - that time in the context of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Section 601 of Title VI provides that no person shall "on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or
activity" receiving federal funds. 40 Section 602 of the Title requires federal
agencies "to effectuate the provisions" of the statute "by issuing rules, regu-
lations, or orders of general applicability." 4 1 In compliance, federal agencies
promulgated rules forbidding intentional discrimination as well as actions
with a disparate impact. Specifically as to disparate impact, federal agency
rules provide that funding recipients cannot "utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimina-
tion because of their race, color or national origin." 42 Unlike Title VII, Title
VI contains no explicit private right of action. The Court in the 1979 case
36 See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341
(2010).
37 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 627 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's test,
"drawn from inapposite equal protection precedents, is not elaborated"). Justice Ginsburg
argued that the Court had "stack[ed] the deck further by denying respondents any chance to
satisfy the newly announced strong-basis-in-evidence standard." Id. at 631 ("When this court
formulates a new legal rule, the ordinary course is to remand and allow the lower courts to
apply the rule in the first instance.").
3 Id. at 585 (majority opinion).
39 See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010) (holding that a plaintiff who fails to
file a timely charge when a disparate impact practice is adopted may challenge the later appli-
cation of that practice in a disparate impact suit).
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).
41 Id. § 2000d-1.
42 E.g., DOJ Discrimination Prohibited, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013); DOT Discrimi-
nation Prohibited, 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2012).
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Cannon v. University of Chicago43 found Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972 privately enforceable." This decision explicitly encompassed
Title VI, which had served as the model for Title IX.45
In Alexander v. Sandoval,46 however, in an opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, the Court held that though private suits were permissible to enforce
section 601 of Title VI, the disparate impact regulations promulgated by the
agencies were not privately enforceable. First, the Court relied on its past
decisions holding that section 601 of Title VI prohibited only intentional
discrimination. 47 As I discuss in greater detail in Part II, there is ample rea-
son to be skeptical of these past decisions - they sealed a narrower defini-
tion of discrimination in the statute than that promulgated in agency
regulations by the Executive Branch, which had participated in the drafting
of the statute, shortly after passage.4 1
The Court's second move was to hold that the implied private right of
action extended only to section 601 and not to its regulations. According to
the Court, because the disparate impact regulations prohibited conduct that
section 601 allowed, Cannon's implied private right of action for section 601
could not carry over to the impact regulations. 49 Additionally, the Court
found no intent to create a private right or remedy (no "rights creating lan-
guage" 0) in the text or structure of section 602.11
The Court's decision in Sandoval thus destabilized Title VI. Quite sim-
ply, it made the disparate impact provisions less useful for private parties -
confining plaintiffs to administrative complaints rather than courts.52 The
decision also brought into sharp relief Title VI's own version of a Ricci prob-
lem: a seeming collision between section 601's coverage of intentional dis-
crimination and the disparate impact regulations allowed by section 602.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court assumed the validity of the regulations,
noting that the State had not "challenged the regulations here." 3 Still, Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion highlighted the "considerable tension" between the dis-
43 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
4 See id. at 694.
4 See id. at 694, 699. Further, after Cannon, Congress abrogated states' Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity in Title VI suits. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807; see also Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72
(1992) (reading these amendments as a "validation of Cannon's holding").
* 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
47 Id. at 280.
48 See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
49 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (relying on prior holding that a "private plaintiff may not
bring a [suit based on a regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of
[the statute]" (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
s
0 Id. at 291.
5' Id. at 289 ("Far from displaying congressional intent to create new rights, § 602 limits
agencies to 'effecutat[ing]' rights already created by § 601." (alteration in original)).
52 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives
in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1352 (2012) (noting effect of Sandoval on civil
rights litigants).
5 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
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parate impact regulations and the Court's prior holdings that section 601
extended only to intentional discrimination. 54
In general this skepticism about disparate impact reflects ideas echoed
in other judicial decisions as well as academic commentary about the norma-
tive place of disparate impact in antidiscrimination law. This skepticism
often stems from the idea that disparate impact originated from an exercise
in judicial overreach - that the disparate impact standard instantiated a
reading of the Civil Rights Act at odds with congressional understandings
centered on intentional discrimination." Other commentary has noted judi-
cial reluctance to enforce robustly disparate impact standards in lower court
litigation 6 - which I have elsewhere argued reflects judicial skepticism
about judicial competence to administer the remedies seemingly required by
disparate impact law and the standard's potential to destabilize a range of
institutional actions."
This skeptical reading casts disparate treatment firmly at the core of the
antidiscrimination regime, with disparate impact teetering as antidiscrimina-
tion law's questionable spin off. In the next Part, I suggest that a harder look
at the roots of disparate impact in agency actions has the potential to miti-
gate some of the concerns and skepticism that commentators and courts have
about disparate impact law. On a formal level, administrative law precepts
provide a basis for shoring up disparate impact: disparate impact - particu-
larly for those agencies with interpretive authority - is a reasonable con-
struction and implementation of the ambiguity of the meaning of
"discrimination" that exists in all civil rights statutes. But beyond this for-
mal justification of disparate impact, the next Part also argues that the
agency role reminds us that disparate impact has always been a part of an-
tidiscrimination law. Disparate impact standards were not invented by
courts; agencies have played a role in developing and implementing those
standards in ways that reflect their specific competence. I offer these argu-
ments with an eye towards the upcoming battle over disparate impact stan-
54 Id.
5 See, e.g., Michael Evan Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommenda-
tion for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 491-500 (1985); see also PAUL D. MORENO, FROM
DIRECT ACTION To AFFIRMATIVE ACnoN: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA
1933-1972, at 1-2 (1997) (introducing "disparate impact" as outside of the "unequal treat-
ment" colorblindness understanding that served as the foundation of civil rights laws); JoHN
DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE AcriON: POLITICS, CULTURE AND JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 120-21, 127-31 (1996) (describing developments such as disparate impact as mov-
ing away from the "color-blind" approach of Title VII, which focused on the intent of the
discriminator).
56 See Abernathy, supra note 12, at 294-312 (reviewing Title VI appellate court opinions);
Selmi, supra note 12, at 734-42 (reviewing reported appellate and trial court Title VII
decisions).
" See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLum. L. REV. 374, 399 (2007)
(arguing, in the context of Title VI, that "concerns about judicial competence and the broad
reach of disparate impact rules" have made some courts reluctant to adequately implement
disparate impact rules).
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dards in the FHA, where whether the Court provides deference to the agency
depends crucially on abandoning the notion that disparate impact is solely
for the courts to define.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE AGENCY ROLE
Disparate impact doctrine is not merely the invention of courts, but part
of the implementation of antidiscrimination law by relevant agencies. This
aspect of disparate impact has been intermittently recognized by commenta-
tors and in court opinions, but it bears emphasizing because the Court's 1971
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. decision is typically offered as the shorthand for
disparate impact's creation. In this vein, the Ricci decision locates the Su-
preme Court's decision in Griggs that Title VII prohibited facially neutral
practices that were "discriminatory in operation" as disparate impact's start-
ing point." The story, according to the Ricci Court, is that Title VII as en-
acted in 1964 provided "only for disparate treatment," but "in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., the Court interpreted the Act to prohibit, in some cases,
employers' facially neutral practices that in fact are 'discriminatory in opera-
tion."' 9 Similarly, in the years before the 1991 Civil Rights Act codified
the disparate impact proof framework, key commentators discussed (and de-
fended) the Court's interpretation of disparate impact in Griggs as a product
of common law judging - a judicial interpretation of a broadly worded
statute.60 Yet, as I show in this Part, agencies were the first movers in devel-
oping disparate impact standards in both Title VI and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act. This understanding of the agency role, I argue, should under-
mine any claim that the Civil Rights Act provided for "only" disparate treat-
ment, and instead reveals disparate impact as a reasonable interpretive
choice given the implementation problems that necessarily attend antidis-
crimination law.
A. Foregrounding Agencies
In Title VII, the EEOC, and not courts, first elaborated what we now
know as the disparate impact or "effects" standard. Prior to Griggs, the
EEOC interpreted the 1964 Act to reach certain practices with a disparate
impact. The 1964 Act explicitly authorized the use of "professionally devel-
oped ability test[s]" that are "not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race."61 In August 1966, the EEOC issued guidance interpreting
"'professionally developed ability test' to mean a test which fairly measures
5 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009).
5 Id.
' See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Dis-
crimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1306-07 (1987) (describing disparate impact as appropriate
common law gap filling).
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
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the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of job."62 The
EEOC subsequently issued additional guidelines in 1970 requiring that em-
ployers using tests have available "data demonstrating that the test is predic-
tive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior
which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are
being evaluated."63 The EEOC's interpretive actions stemmed from early
recognition that interpreting the Act as limited to intentional discrimination
would make it ineffectual against a range of southern practices that had been
adopted in the wake of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."
Further, in the context of Title VI, federal agencies had interpreted that
provision to include claims of disparate impact even before Griggs and the
EEOC action. Within a year after the passage of Title VI, the federal agen-
cies charged with implementing Title VI's prohibition of discrimination in
federally funded programs promulgated regulations prohibiting not just in-
tentional discrimination, but practices that have "the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as
respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin."6
This account of the development of disparate impact law under Title VI
and Title VII makes plain the longstanding place of disparate impact in an-
tidiscrimination law. As I discuss below, these early interpretations of the
Civil Rights Act by agencies to reach disparate impact suggest the absence
of a time in which the meaning of discrimination was not contested -
where the meaning of "discrimination" was solely limited to disparate treat-
ment. The meaning of "discrimination" in fact emerges as agencies (as well
as private litigants and courts) grapple with the problem of implementing
civil rights statutes.
B. Implications
Agencies have played a key role in shaping the contours of the dispa-
rate impact standard. First, as I discuss below, agencies' interpretation of
"discrimination" to include disparate impact occurred shortly after passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and thus speaks to the ambiguity in "discrimi-
nation" recognized by early interpreters. Second, in key respects, agencies
define and implement disparate impact in light of their ability to identify
62 EEOC, GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES 2 (1966); see also Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1971) (quoting EEOC, supra, at 2).
6 Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1970); Griggs,
401 U.S. at 433 n.9 (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)).
' ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 69-75 (1993).
61 See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1965) (regulations of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare).
134
The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact
evolving problems and challenges in implementing civil rights statutes' an-
tidiscrimination directives.66
1. Shaping "Discrimination."
Discrimination is undefined in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and in key
decisions the Court has subtly charged itself with defining the contours of
discrimination. In Ricci, for instance, the Court borrows the "strong basis in
evidence" standard from its constitutional cases." Given the potential
breadth of the meaning of discrimination, the lack of an explicit definition,
and the centrality of litigation as a method of implementing the 1964 Act,6
the Court's common law judging approach to defining the contours of "dis-
crimination" has a certain appeal.69 It is the approach the Court adopted in
cases like Connecticut v. TeaF0 and Wards Cove v. Atonio," in which it de-
veloped rules for guiding disparate impact cases, filling the statutory gaps
before the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Yet, an exclusively common law approach
risks ignoring definitions of discrimination that may be at odds with judicial
conceptions of discrimination. It also shields the way that the institutional
context in which courts must implement antidiscrimination norms shapes
judicial conceptions of discrimination. This context may be quite different
for other institutional actors such as administrative agencies.72 As I discuss
in what follows, Congress did not settle on the contours of "discrimination"
in the Civil Rights Act, and it gave agencies a role in shaping the meaning of
discrimination.
In the case of Title VII, the original text of the 1964 Act cannot answer
the question of whether "discrimination" includes disparate impact. It is no
doubt true that language in section 703(h) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
added on the floor during Senate debates, states that it is not unlawful "for
an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally devel-
* See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTEs 7 (2010).
67 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 582-84 (2009).
6 See Johnson, supra note 52, at 1346 (describing the private attorney general model as
"an important mechanism for advancing antidiscrimination goals" while addressing its
limitations).
6' See Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are
"Common Law Statutes" Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAw 89,
96 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (arguing that because the EEOC "does not have the
authority to create binding substantive regulations interpreting and implementing Title VII, as
a practical matter courts are responsible for elaborating the meaning of the statute"); Ruther-
glen, supra note 60, at 1299-1307.
70 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) (holding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of
disparate impact by showing that one component of a selection procedure had a discriminatory
disparate impact even if the "bottom line" final pool included an appropriate representation of
minorities).
7' 490 U.S. 642, 658-60 (1989) (adopting a test that made it easier for defendants to
satisfy disparate impact's burden shifting test).
72 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 389-90, 399-400 (discussing limitations of disparate
impact as deriving in part from concerns about institutional competence).
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oped ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." 73 Yet this begs the question of what
"discriminate" means. Congress left "discrimination" undefined in the Act.
The legislative history, well pored over as we near the fiftieth anniversary of
the Act, contains conflicting history on whether "discrimination" was meant
to be limited to intentional discrimination, with arguments supporting both
sides. 7 4 All told, neither the text nor the legislative history can settle the
question of what "discriminate" means.
Additionally, as several commentators have noted, prevailing ideas of
"discrimination" at the time of the 1964 Civil Rights Act advanced in ad-
ministrative and other implementation contexts include the disparate impact
standard ultimately adopted by the EEOC.75 Paul Moreno has shown that
the disparate impact approach was rooted in notions advanced by federal
agencies in the New Deal era and by executive orders advanced in the early
years of the Kennedy Administration.76 More recently, Professor Susan
Carle has revealed that the EEOC implementation of disparate impact grew
in part out of work by civil rights groups and the New York State Commis-
sion Against Discrimination before passage of the Civil Rights Act. Accord-
ing to Carle, the Commission advanced early versions of the disparate
impact idea to address the difficulties in proving intentional discrimination.77
Moreover, adding Title VI to the analytic mix casts further doubt on a
claim that Congress had in mind a fixed notion of "intentional discrimina-
tion" and should buttress the legitimacy of agencies' role in shaping the
meaning of discrimination. Title VI is where the Court has been most force-
ful in limiting the meaning of the statute - defining the statute as confined
to intentional discrimination and thus creating the awkward collision dis-
7 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
74 The key prohibitions of the Act, including the meaning of "discrimination," were unde-
fined. In the absence of a definition, commentators have drawn opposing conclusions about
whether Congress intended to encompass claims of disparate impact. Compare Gold, supra
note 55, at 491-500 (contending that Congress intended Title VII to prohibit only intentional
discrimination), with Rutherglen, supra note 60, at 1302-07 (disputing claims that Congress
meant to limit Title VII to intentional discrimination). Senator Hubert Humphrey, a key spon-
sor, stated that "[t]he meaning of racial or religious discrimination is perfectly clear. . . . it
means a distinction in treatment given to different individuals because of their race, religion, or
national origin." 110 CONG. REc. 5423 (1964). Humphrey's remarks may be read as support-
ing a disparate treatment account. But Professor Alfred Blumrosen, a former counsel at the
EEOC who played a role in developing the effects test, has noted ambiguity in even this
statement as to whether the "differential treatment" could be based on policies that might be
race-neutral but have a racial effect. See BLUMROSEN, supra note 64, at 50-51 ("Does Senator
Humphrey's statement help decide whether the 'difference in treatment' has to be intentional?
Does the phrase 'because of' race or sex require a conscious intent or a result which affects
people differently depending on their race?").
s E.g., Neal E. Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1738-39 (1991).
7 6 PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION To AFFIRMATIVE AcTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT
LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA 1933-1972, 1-2 (1997).
7 Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63
FLA. L. REV. 251, 294-96 (2011).
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cussed in Sandoval in which a disparate treatment statute seems at odds with
disparate impact regulations.7 But this reading of the statute, which sepa-
rates the asserted true meaning of the statute from its implementing regula-
tions, results from a set of disjointed decisions of the Supreme Court.
Specifically, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke79 - best
known for its ruling on the constitutionality of higher education affirmative
action - five Justices of the Court contended that section 601 of Title VI
prohibits only intentional discrimination. 0 These five justices held that Title
VI could extend no further than the Constitution, and thus, pursuant to the
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,8' required a showing of
intent.82 This portion of the opinion is arguably dicta as neither the plaintiff s
claim nor the Court's decision turned on whether the statute prohibited inten-
tional or disparate impact discrimination. Yet, in subsequent decisions, the
Court has relied on Bakke to conclude that the Title VI statute by its terms
- Title VI "itself' - is limited to intentional discrimination.
At the outset, even apart from the role of the agency, there are strong
reasons to doubt this reading of Title VI. Discrimination is undefined in
Title VI (as in Title VII) and the legislative record advances no clear account
of the meaning of discrimination. To be sure, there is language in Title VI's
legislative history to support Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that Con-
gress intended through Title VI to remedy violations of the Constitution."
But the legislative record supports an expansive reading of those constitu-
tional norms and of Title VI's goals. President Kennedy, in introducing Title
VI, announced its broad goals, stating that "[s]imple justice requires that
public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in
any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial
discrimination."8  A key Senate sponsor of Title VI contended that Title VI
targeted practices of segregation and discrimination, even those that might
not be firmly unconstitutional, instituting a mandate that federal funds be
"spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Na-
78 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) ("It is beyond dispute ... that
§ 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination."); id. at 285 ("It is clear ... that the disparate-
impact regulations do not simply apply § 601 - since they indeed forbid conduct
that § 601 permits - and therefore clear that the private right of action to enforce § 601 does
not include a private right to enforce these regulations.").
7 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80 Id. at 282 ("Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.").
8 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
82 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); id. at 328
(opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
83 Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610 (1983) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 612 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 Justice Powell's review of the "voluminous legislative history of Title VI" led him to
conclude that Congress intended to "halt federal funding of entities that violate a prohibition
of racial discrimination similar to that of the Constitution." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284.
" 109 CONG. REc. 11,174, 11,178 (1963).
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tion."6 Congressional members referred to constitutional norms in ways
that encompassed disparate impact.87
It is thus far from clear that participants in the legislative process
equated the constitutional standard with intentional discrimination or dispa-
rate treatment. What does seem clear, however, is that the Court has read
Title VI in line with its own constitutional rulings, rulings that came subse-
quent to Title VI. Two terms prior to deciding Bakke - but twelve years
after passage of Title VI - the Court held in Washington v. Davis that the
Equal Protection Clause only extended to claims of disparate treatment.88
The distinction, however, between impact and intent was not firmly estab-
lished in constitutional analysis at the time of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as
evidenced by equal protection decisions prior to Washington v. Davis in
which lower courts applied impact analysis in constitutional law. 9
This account may also have implications for Title VII. While Title VII
developed on a separate track from Title VI, it was part of the same Act and
it would seem unlikely that "discrimination" should acquire a different
meaning in the fair employment context than in the context of programs
receiving federal funding. At minimum, any such distinction would likely
have prompted some explanation in the legislative record.
To bring the agencies' enforcement role into the account raises further
questions about the extant doctrinal understanding of Title VI as limited to
intentional discrimination. While Congress gave the EEOC limited power in
enforcing Title VII, Title VI sought to unleash administrative power. In en-
acting Title VI, Congress explicitly gave agencies power to determine
whether federal fund recipients were engaging in discrimination or exclu-
sion, and to adopt appropriate remedies including the termination of federal
86 110 CONG. REc. 6490, 6544 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also id. ("In
many instances the practices of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are
unconstitutional. This is clearly so wherever Federal funds go to a State agency which engages
in racial discrimination. It may also be so where Federal funds go to support private, segre-
gated institutions .... In all cases, such racial discrimination is contrary to national policy,
and to the moral sense of the Nation. Thus, title VI is simply designed to insure that Federal
funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation.").
87 For instance, one of the House sponsors suggested an understanding of the constitu-
tional requirements as going beyond invidiousness, contending that "the Constitution may
impose on the United States an affirmative duty to preclude racial segregation or discrimina-
tion by the recipient of Federal aid." 110 CONG. REc. 1514, 1528 (1964) (statement of Rep.
Celler); see also Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for
Defining "Discrimination," 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1981) (detailing lack of agreement among
members of the legislative and executive branch on the meaning of discrimination).
88 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting the contention that an official act is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) (holding that "official action will not
be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact").
89 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc).
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funding.90 The statute required executive agencies and departments to pro-
mulgate regulations to enforce the substantive provisions of the statute.9'
The statute also required that the President explicitly approve these regula-
tions.9 2 These first regulations promulgated under Title VI in 1964 contained
language specifying an "effects" standard 93 and resulted from an extraordi-
nary coordinated drafting effort of all federal agencies and the White
House.94 Each agency drafted a rule and submitted it to the Department of
Justice, which then worked with a task force consisting of the White House,
the Bureau of Budget, and the Civil Rights Commission to draft the final
rules.95 The task force first developed regulations for the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, which then became the model for all other
federal agencies. 96
The relevance of Congress' grant of significant power through Title VI
is twofold. First, considerable evidence in the legislative record suggests
that Congress did not settle on a meaning of discrimination in the statute,
and instead delegated to agencies the power to develop a context-specific
understanding of discrimination.97 Second, and more fundamentally, as I
discuss in the next section, Title VI created an explicit regime that allowed
the agency authority in shaping disparate impact - a regime in which Title
VI "itself' and its regulations are intimately connected.
Read as a whole, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 leaves open the meaning
of "discrimination" and, especially in the case of Title VI, provides an ex-
plicit role for agencies in shaping its meaning.
* See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (2006) (empowering agencies to enforce their regulations by
terminating funding or "by any other means authorized by law").
9' See id.
92 See id. ("No [enforcement] rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and
until approved by the President.").
9 See HEW Discrimination Prohibited, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1965) ("A recipient ...
may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of
their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race,
color, or national origin.").
94 Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Implementation and Impact, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 846 n.19 (1967-1968).
9 Id. at 845-46.
96 Id. at 846.
" Abernathy, supra note 87, at 29-30 (providing evidence that provision of regulatory
authority to define discrimination emerged as a compromise). Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy, testifying in support of the bill, contended that while section 601 would provide "a
general criterion to follow," agencies "will establish the rules that will be followed in the
administration of the program - so that the recipients of the program will understand what
they can or cannot do." Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong. 2740 (1963) (statement of Robert Kennedy, Att'y Gen. of the United
States).
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2. Disparate Impact Implementation and Agency Competence.
The implementation of disparate impact also stems from a set of agency
competences that differ from those of courts. While judicial resistance to
disparate impact may stem in part from concerns about court capacity to
determine what impacts should be actionable and to develop appropriate
remedies,98 agencies develop disparate impact within a particular regulatory
and programmatic context in response to their knowledge of problems in a
particular area.99 Disparate impact must be understood within the contours
of civil rights' hybrid enforcement regime - one which gives agencies the
power to promulgate regulations and guidance, and to review and resolve
complaints. Looking first at Title VII and then at Title VI, this section
shows how this hybrid enforcement regime contributes to our understanding
of disparate impact.
Disparate impact in Title VII emerged from the EEOC's recognition of
employers' potentially easy evasion of the statute's goal through the adoption
of formally race-neutral but exclusionary methods. The 1964 Civil Rights
Act authorized the use of "professionally developed ability tests" that are
not "designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,"'0 and the
EEOC issued guidance in August 1966 interpreting "'professionally devel-
oped ability test' to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or
skills required by the particular job or class of jobs."10' The EEOC subse-
quently issued additional guidelines in 1970 requiring that employers using
tests have "empirical data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or sig-
nificantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which com-
prise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated." 02 This guidance constituted the EEOC's response to practices
by southern employers that restricted employment opportunities for blacks,
but that were facially race neutral.103 In the absence of clear evidence that
" See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
" This functional argument about agency expertise is linked of course to the underlying
justifications for deference in administrative law. As the Court noted in Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., deference to agencies is warranted because agencies' interpretations "constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment." 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (outlining the factors that bear
on an agency's "power to persuade" even in the case of nonbinding interpretations that lack
formal "power to control").
'n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
i' EEOC, supra note 62, at 2; accord Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9
(1971) (quoting EEOC, supra note 62, at 2).
102 Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1970); accord
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9 (relying on 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)).
1o3 Historian Hugh Graham provides a skeptical account of the EEOC's move to disparate
impact, but even so notes in his account that the "[EEOC] nevertheless enjoyed an abundance
of targets throughout the South that fairly begged for a linkage between statistical disparities
and certain highly suspect practices of the workplace. High on such a list were two formidable
barriers to black advancement: employee tests and seniority systems." HUGH DAVIs GRAHAM,
THE CIVIL RIGHrs ERA: ORIGINs & DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at
247-48 (1990).
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these practices were adopted to bar blacks intentionally, challenging those
practices would be nearly impossible."0 In addition, the EEOC's disparate
impact regulations permitted a structural response to the problem of discrim-
ination and exclusion - allowing group-based remedies rather than piece-
meal individual litigation or complaints. 05 Under this account, disparate
impact is the agency's pragmatic, problem-solving response to the challenges
of implementing the statute.106
Some have no doubt viewed the EEOC's interpretive move skeptically
given that Congress created the EEOC as a weak agency, and limited it to
issuing "procedural" regulations to enforce Title VII.107 And to be sure, the
EEOC's regulatory limitations mean that its actions will not be afforded def-
erence under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,'o" but the more limited Skidmore deference.'09
Yet if the EEOC lacks power to issue binding substantive regulations,
the 1964 Civil Rights Act granted the EEOC a set of enforcement powers
that proved important in developing the disparate impact standard. The
o BLUMROSEN, supra note 64, at 73.
'os Id. at 80. Sociologist John Skrentny has argued generally that the EEOC's develop-
ment of group-based solutions like affirmative action and disparate impact represented a prag-
matic way to deal with a flood of individual complaints. JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 125-27 (1996) (in the context of affirmative action, providing an
account of EEOC's "administrative pragmatism" - its realization that "responding to the
complaints of properly abstract citizens was a blueprint for failure").
'" Susan Carle has emphasized this point most recently. See Carle, supra note 77, at 297.
Alfred Blumrosen, a key drafter of the EEOC's initial disparate impact guidance, has supported
the Griggs decision on similar rationales. BLUMROSEN, supra note 64, at 73-75 (arguing that
the effects test was not compelled by the statute but was a pragmatic regulatory choice; the
"effect test was aimed at changing industrial relations systems with a minimum of governmen-
tal effort and at maximizing the influence of the law on industrial relations practices").
107 A key compromise in the 1964 Civil Rights Act ensured that the EEOC would be a
constrained, weak agency. Though civil tights advocates urged the creation of an agency with
lawmaking and adjudicatory power over Title VII complaints, opponents advocated for an
agency with less power. On this front, opponents won and the EEOC, as created, lacked
adjudicatory power, and its regulatory power was limited to "procedural" rather than substan-
tive regulations. For an account, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LIrGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULA-
TION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 106-09, 113-14 (2010) (detailing stances on the
power of the proposed EEOC and congressional actions limiting EEOC enforcement power)
and Robert C. Lieberman, Weak State, Strong Policy: Paradoxes of Race Policy in the United
States, Great Britain, and France, 16 STUD. AM. POt'Y. DEV. 138, 138, 141 (2002).
108 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
"See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Prior to Chevron, the Court in
Griggs held that "administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to
great deference," Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971), but it has subse-
quently been unwilling to grant the EEOC Chevron deference, see, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 n.6 (2002) (applying Skidmore deference to the EEOC's
interpretation of what constitutes a continuing violation under Title VII). See generally Me-
lissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1937, 1941-45 (2006). Indeed, as Melissa Hart has noted, even where the EEOC has formal
rulemaking power (as for procedural regulations or for certain provisions in the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2006)), the Court has not consist-
ently afforded the agency Chevron deference. See Hart, supra, at 1941-45 (detailing those
decisions in which the Court declined to determine the appropriate standard of deference to the
EEOC's interpretation or declined to give it Chevron deference).
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EEOC was charged with investigating complaints from private litigants
under the Act, but beyond that had the power to conduct investigations, hold
hearings, and subpoena information from employers. This provided the
EEOC with greater understanding of on-the-ground realities facing African
American workers, and the practices engaged in by employers that under-
mined the goals of the Civil Rights Act.
The EEOC can also shape the enforcement of disparate impact in ways
that emerge from its knowledge of the contexts in which the standard might
be enforced. For instance, the EEOC developed disparate impact guidance,
providing more specific rules for determining the extent of the impact neces-
sary to create a cause of action. In 1978 the EEOC announced a guidance
delineating that a selection rate for a protected group that is less than four-
fifths of the applicant pool, or 80%, generally constitutes an adverse im-
pact.1io The agency also issued guidance on how to create valid selection
devices."' The EEOC has also over the years developed rules on how to
avoid practices with disparate impacts - most recently issuing guidance on
how employers might avoid disparate impact discrimination in the consider-
ation of arrest and conviction records in employment decisions." 2 This type
of guidance, even if not binding on employers," 3 provides notice to employ-
ers of claims that might trigger enforcement attention' "4 and serves the goal
of promoting voluntary compliance with the Act - addressing discrimina-
tion without resort to court enforcement."' Agencies like the EEOC process
administrative complaints, hold hearings, and conduct investigations" 6 that
provide them with knowledge of specific exclusionary practices, and that
0See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290,
38,294 (Aug. 25, 1978); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 43 Fed. Reg.
40,223, 40,223 (Sept. 11, 1978).
"' See Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a Common Interpreta-
tion of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,996,
11,997 (Mar. 2, 1979).
12 See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE No. 915-02, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND
CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 8 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_convic
tion.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/OPUfqddovdX.
"I' The Supreme Court grants the more limited Skidmore deference to EEOC guidelines.
See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 n.6 (2002) (applying Skid-
more deference to the EEOC's interpretation of what constitutes a continuing violation under
Title VII).
114 See Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432 (Jan.
25, 2007) (noting that guidance documents serve to "interpret existing law through an interpre-
tive rule or to clarify how they tentatively will treat or enforce a governing legal norm through
a policy statement").
"' See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963) (contending that the Act would "create
an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination");
EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL SECTION 15: RACE & COLOR DISCRIMINATION 15-3 (2006),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/05B
WJRs2HY2 (issuing manual to further EEOC's "strong interest in proactive prevention and
'best practices'").
"6 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4-2000e-5 (2006) (specifying duties and responsibilities of the
EEOC).
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also allow them to suggest remedies and best practices responsive to the
requirements of various stakeholders. By contrast, courts are less well posi-
tioned to adopt this kind of tailored enforcement. Commentators like Pro-
fessor Selmi have shown how courts are often reluctant to find violations of
Title VII on a disparate impact theory, and often defer to the employer's
claims of business necessity."' Similarly, I have suggested that this caution
in applying disparate impact reflects courts' concern about their capacity to
impose a broad remedy or their reluctance to interfere with institutional
decisionmaking.118
The power agencies have to shape disparate impact standards is even
more robust in the context of Title VI. In Title VI, the 1964 Civil Rights Act
gives a strong role to federal agencies to adopt rules and regulations to im-
plement antidiscrimination prohibitions, rules that are binding on federal
agencies and grantees. The effects test in Title VI arose immediately after
the Act, as agencies sought to have mutually consistent rules to give clarity
to grantees and to allow themselves flexibility to develop rules for the pro-
grams they regulate.I"1 Federal agencies have gone beyond this initial articu-
lation of broad disparate impact rules to detail what disparate impact means
in particular regulatory contexts. As I have noted in prior writing, agencies
have detailed rules in the context of transportation and agriculture that re-
quire federal grantees to take affirmative steps to avoid disparate impacts.12 0
These rules emerged from agencies' supervision of a specific set of programs
and the expertise they acquired about the types of discrimination and exclu-
sion that arose in those programs.
In the context of Title VI, the power of federal agencies to resolve civil
rights complaints further shapes disparate impact. The factfinding and reme-
dial powers provided in this administrative context differ from those of
courts. When a complainant alleges disparate impact, federal agencies can
investigate the claim with greater knowledge about the underlying program
than a generalist court would have. In shaping the remedy, a federal agency
has the power not only to withhold funds, but also to develop a remedial
"' See Selmi, supra note 12.
"1 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 399-401.
"' A large part of the urgency in drafting Title VI rules was the fear of agency power with
regard to terminating federal funds. Senator Pastore, in explaining section 602 on the Senate
floor, made clear that agencies were given a "certain degree of latitude in the procedure by
which [they] accomplish[ ] the mandate to eliminate discrimination" but that "[a]ction is
mandatory." 110 CONG. REc. S2,7058 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1964) (statement of Sen. Pastore);
see also id. at 7059 ("The rule or regulation issued by the particular Federal agency would
vary, depending on the nature and method of administration of the particular assistance
program.").
120 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2013); FED. TRANSrr ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF TRANsp., CIR-
cuLAR FTA C 4702.1A, TITLE VI AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL
TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTs 11-1 (2007); OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP OF
AGRIC., CIVIL RIGHTS bMPACT ANALYSIS 1 (2003), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/direc
tives/doc/DR4300-4.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/04sYB8Cjr4l; see also Johnson, supra
note 52, at 1364.
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plan, working with federal grantees to adopt practices that may mitigate im-
pacts found.12 1 The Department of Education, which is charged with enforc-
ing Title VI, has used this strategy. In recent years, plaintiffs have filed
administrative complaints against school districts whose discipline policies
allegedly adversely impacted minority school children. 22 Upon finding dis-
parate impact, the Department of Education has worked with school districts
as well as complainants to develop best practices in school discipline poli-
cies that avoid discriminatory effects, promote safety, improve data collec-
tion and record keeping, and allow input from affected families and
students.123 Agencies do not work within the binary structure that generally
characterizes litigation, and thus can develop a set of tailored remedies or
alternative practices that respond to various constituencies and stakeholders.
Any discussion about agencies' expertise and capacities must of course
be careful to grapple with their limitations. Agencies are subject to political
manipulation and capture by particular interests, and may be insufficiently
aggressive in promoting civil rights goals. 2 4 When they do undertake vigor-
ous enforcement activity, they are subject to criticism for overreaching.125
The flexibility that agencies have to craft remedies may be subject to claims
that the agencies' actions are arbitrary.
My claim, however, is not that agency enforcement is superior to that
of courts or that agencies will always rise to their enforcement or regulatory
capacity. Rather, it is to emphasize that the 1964 Civil Rights Act's antidis-
crimination regime, in which disparate impact operates, is a hybrid regime
with agencies as key players as well as courts. Understanding this hybridity
provides a richer account of how disparate impact standards actually
emerged and of how they are enforced by agencies charged with investigat-
ing, rulemaking, and complaint resolution. This hybridity responds to the
121 See Coordination of Enforcement of Non-discrimination in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams, 28 C.F.R. § 42.411 (2013) (detailing methods of resolving noncompliance).
122 See U.S. DEPr OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIViL RIGHTS, TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT HIGH-
LIGHTS 8 (2012), available at www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/title-vi-enforcement.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/0Wz74knAGnE (stating that from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year
2011, the Department of Education received 900 complaints about civil rights violations in-
volving school discipline, and from fiscal year 2009 through early 2012 the Office of Civil
Rights launched twenty investigations).
123 See id. at 9-10 (detailing remedies developed with school districts including teacher
training, providing support for struggling students, implementing school climate surveys, es-
tablishing district-wide discipline coordinator, creating systems for collecting and evaluating
data on school discipline, and developing programs to share information with families and
students).
124 For instance, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund initiated litigation to force what was
then the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to enforce Title VI in higher education.
See Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92, 94 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). The D.C. Circuit ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the private parties
could not bring actions against federal officials for failing to enforce Title VI. See Women's
Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
' See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMrrs OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TILE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACr 52-57 (1995) (describing criticism of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare's 1966 Guidelines promoting school integration).
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limitations and concerns raised about the potentially broad reach of disparate
impact standards when one focuses only on their enforcement by courts.126
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR FAIR HOUSING
How we understand the role of agencies in shaping disparate impact has
implications for the looming battle over disparate impact under the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA"). The lesson learned from an examination of
Title VI and Title VII is that the civil rights regime did not settle on a mean-
ing of discrimination, and that agencies have long had a role in shaping
disparate impact. The agency actions that shaped disparate impact are con-
sistent with agencies' formal roles in the civil rights regulatory regime as
well as their functional reality. The story of disparate impact is not the same
for each statute or each agency. Under Title VII, the EEOC cannot issue
binding substantive rules to enforce the statute. But it has and can shape
disparate impact through its formal powers and functions of investigation
and problem solving, and by issuing guidance followed by employers.'27 Ti-
tle VI contemplates a different role for agencies, giving them power to issue
binding rules and regulations for their programs and grantees, and also
power to investigate and resolve claims of discrimination.128
The FHA, which I turn to in this Part, has its own story. The FHA,
though it uses the language of discrimination, is not part of the same 1964
statute that contains Title VI and Title VII. And the agency's disparate im-
pact rule emerged for the first time in February 2013, years after initial pas-
sage of the statute. Indeed, much commentary locates the origins of the
FHA's disparate impact theory not in administrative law or practice, but in-
stead in a lower court opinion - United States v. Black Jack'29 - in which
the Eighth Circuit read the FHA in pari materia with Title VII (after Griggs)
to reach effects claims.'3 0 And yet, as I explore below, a focus on HUD's
particular competence and capacities helps us understand its interpretive and
regulatory role. I offer this not only as a basis for sustaining HUD's action
as a reasonable reading of the statute under Chevron, but also to suggest
more broadly that this deference makes sense given the expansive powers
that the FHA as amended in 1988 gives to HUD in the fair housing regula-
tory regime.
126 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing judicial competence about
broad reach of disparate impact standards and courts' ability to administer remedies).
127 See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 65 and accompanying text
129 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).3 0 d. at 1184-85.
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A. The Emergence of Disparate Impact in the FHA
The FHA makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent . .. or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 3' The Act allows for pri-
vate enforcement in court and in administrative adjudications by HUD, but
like Title VII prior to the 1991 amendments, it does not explicitly delineate a
disparate impact standard.
1. Interpretation by Courts.
In the 1974 case United States v. Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit read the
Act to allow claims of disparate impact.132 The litigation began when the
United States brought a claim under the FHA against the City of Black Jack,
Missouri - a town with few racial minorities - for adopting a zoning
ordinance that prohibited the construction of any multiple-family dwell-
ings.133 The United States contended that this zoning exclusion operated to
exclude low- and moderate-income residents who in the context of the racial
composition of the surrounding county were overwhelmingly African Amer-
ican. 134 In holding that the FHA extended to disparate impact claims, the
court found that the Act was designed to prohibit "'all forms of discrimina-
tion, sophisticated as well as simple-minded,'" 3 and analogized to Title VII
(as interpreted by Griggs) which seeks "'the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers"' in employment.136 "Effect," the Black Jack court
emphasized, "and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever
men may easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because
'. . . [w]hatever our law was once, . . . we now firmly recognize that the
arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private
rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.'" 3
In the years after Black Jack, courts of appeals around the country went
on to interpret the FHA to allow disparate impact claims.' Such seemed
13 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
32 Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
3
1 Id. at 1181-82.
14 Id. at 1183 (noting that "[tihe virtually all-white character of Black Jack was in
marked contrast to the racial composition of other parts of the St. Louis area"). The United
States had also pursued a claim of intentional discrimination, which the lower court dismissed
and which was left undisturbed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1182.
13 Id. at 1184 (quoting Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974)).
13 6 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
'7 Id. at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff dsub
nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc)).
,3 See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000); Mountain Side
Mobile Estates P'ship v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 1995);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1988),
affd in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Hanson v. Veteran's Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir.
1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ma-
rengo Cnty. Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976
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the state of the law, a unanimity even noted by a key sponsor of the 1988
Amendments to the FHA, which strengthened the Act's core enforcement
provisions.3 9 Yet, the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. In May
2013, the Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the FHA per-
mits disparate impact claims in Township of Mount Holly, New Jersey v. Mt.
Holly Gardens Citizens in Action.140 In the case, residents affected by the
township's proposed redevelopment plan, which sought to demolish a neigh-
borhood and rebuild new homes on the site, claimed that the plan would
have a disparate impact on minority residents whose homes were dispropor-
tionately affected by the plan, and who could not afford to purchase the
redeveloped housing.141 The court of appeals reversed the district court's
holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact 42 and the Supreme Court granted review.143 The parties later
settled the case,144 postponing - at least for the 2013 term - Supreme
Court review of this question.
2. HUD's Disparate Impact Rule.
As the Mount Holly case was winding its way through the courts, HUD,
in February 2013 - after a period of notice and comment - issued a rule
providing that: "[l]iability may be established under the Fair Housing Act
based on a practice's discriminatory effect . . . even if that practice was not
(1984); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Halet v. Wend
Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126,
146 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. Resident Advisory Bd., 435
U.S. 908 (1978); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
' See 134 CONG. REC. 23,711-12 (1988) (Sen. Kennedy, stating on the Senate floor prior
to the vote on the FHA amendments that "Congress accepted th[e] consistent judicial inter-
pretation" "of the [flederal courts of appeals that" the FHA "prohibit[s] acts that have dis-
criminatory effects, and that there is no need to prove discriminatory intent"); see also Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 1988: Hearing on H.R. 558 Before the S. Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 100th Cong. 529 (1987) (testimony of Robert Schwemm, Professor of Law, noting una-
nimity among the circuits that had addressed the issue on the question of disparate impact
discrimination).
140 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-18, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (U.S. June 11, 2012), 2012 WL 2151511; Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting
cert.).
141 See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375,
379 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, No. 11-1507, 2013
WL 6050174 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013).
142 See id. at 382-85 ("When viewed in the light most favorable to the Residents, the
evidence submitted by the Residents was sufficient to establish a prima facie case.").
143 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-18, Mount Holly, No. 11-1507 (U.S. June 11,
2012), 2012 WL 2151511; Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly,
133 S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting cert.).
'" See Liptak supra note 8; see also Order Dismissing Writ of Certiorari, Mount Holly,
No. 11-1507 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 6050174.
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motivated by a discriminatory intent."l 45 In addition, the rule defines dis-
criminatory effect as involving an action that "actually or predictably results
in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces,
or perpetuates segregated housing patterns" on the basis of categories cov-
ered by the Act.146
Beyond broadly permitting impact claims, HUD's rule adopts a specific
burden-shifting framework for proving disparate impact claims. As pro-
vided by the rule, a plaintiff has the initial burden of "proving that a chal-
lenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect." 47
If the plaintiff meets that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show
"that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests." 48 If the defendant meets that bur-
den, the plaintiff can still win by showing that "substantial, legitimate, non-
discriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served
by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect." 49
The question then is how one should view the legality and legitimacy of
this rule. In what follows, I make the case that HUD has formal capacity
under standard administrative law precepts to promulgate the rule, and fur-
ther argue that HUD's promulgation of the rule is appropriate as a question
of institutional design and function.
B. Formal Capacity
Fair housing's regulatory and statutory structure - shaped anew by the
1988 amendments to the FHA - endows HUD with the capacity to deter-
mine the contours of disparate impact. Specifically, the FHA by its terms
makes it unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent ... or otherwise to make unavail-
able or deny, a dwelling to any person because of' a prohibited characteris-
tic, including race or gender.s 0 With relation to disability, the FHA makes it
unlawful to "discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavail-
able or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap.",'
The FHA grants HUD authority to promulgate rules implementing the stat-
ute. 5 2 Moreover, HUD has general rulemaking authority under its enabling
act, giving it the power to make such rules and regulations as necessary to
carry out its functions, powers, and duties.'53
145 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120,
100.130, 100.500).
146 d
147 Id.
14 8 Id.
14 9 Id.
"0 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
' See id. § 3604(f)(1).
152 See id. § 3614(a).
15 See id. § 3635(d).
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One might argue that the language of the statute making it unlawful to
"otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling" establishes a results
test.154 And, as noted above, to the extent that one finds such canons of
interpretation instructive, members of Congress in amending the Act in 1988
were aware that the courts of appeals were unanimous in interpreting the Act
to reach disparate impact claims.' 5 The Supreme Court, further, has relied
on the "otherwise make unavailable or deny" language to support an effects
standard under another civil rights statute, the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1964 ("ADEA").156 Basic statutory interpretation princi-
ples of horizontal coherence would support reading the same language
consistently across the United States Code.'
Yet even if one finds the statutory interpretation of the FHA less than
conclusive - and the legislative history unavailing - basic principles of
administrative deference would support a finding that HUD has authority to
issue these disparate impact regulations. Courts will afford Chevron defer-
ence to an agency where it has power to make rules carrying the force of
law, and has adopted rules pursuant to that authority.'s The disparate im-
pact rules here were promulgated pursuant to HUD's rulemaking authority.15 9
1 See id. § 3604(a).
5 See 134 CONG. REC. 23,711-12 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). As a general
matter, jurisprudence supports the notion that Congress is "presumed to be aware of an admin-
istrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts
a statute without change." See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). Further, Congress
failed to adopt an amendment that would have specifically required proof of intentional dis-
crimination in zoning cases. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 89-91 (1988) (dissenting views of
Rep. Swindall).
"' See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (holding that this "otherwise
make unavailable" language in the ADEA includes a disparate impact standard).
'5 The FHA also uses similar language in other provisions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
(making it unlawful "[tlo refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."); id.
§ 3604(f)(2) (making it unlawful "[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap"). As explained in the context of Title
VI, "discriminate" need not be limited to intentional motivation, and along those lines the
Court has found the term sufficiently ambiguous in other civil rights statutes to support dispa-
rate impact arguments. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (assuming without
deciding that language in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 making it unlawful to
"subject to discrimination" otherwise qualified handicapped individuals "reaches at least
some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped"); Bd. of Educ.
v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 140-41 (1979) (holding that in the context of the 1972 Emergency
School Aid Act, the term "discrimination" was ambiguous and encompassed claims of dispa-
rate impact).
1 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (authorizing Chevron
deference only where Congress delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the
force of law, and where the agency adopted rules pursuant to that authority); Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,460, 11,482 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120,
100.130, 100.500) (citing rulemaking authority under FHA and enabling act as authority for
the rule).
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Thus, even if the FHA does not speak directly to the question of impact
claims, the relevant statutory language is sufficiently ambiguous to support
Chevron deference to HUD's interpretation that the statute encompasses dis-
parate impact.
An argument for deference takes account of the extensive power that
the FHA provides HUD. Notably, HUD has not just rulemaking authority,
but also adjudicatory authority - combined powers that make fair housing's
hybrid regulatory regime (with explicit private enforcement and expansive
public enforcement) the strongest of any civil rights statute as a formal mat-
ter.160 When the FHA was first enacted, HUD's enforcement powers were
limited - HUD had only the power to investigate complaints and conciliate
claims it found meritorious.161 When Congress amended the FHA in 1988, it
strengthened HUD's regulatory powers.162 Specifically, the statute now al-
lows individuals to file complaints with the Secretary of HUD, which are
adjudicated by HUD administrative law judges.163 After opportunity for all
parties to petition the Secretary of HUD, these formal adjudications become
final agency decisions.64
Since at least 1992 - four years after enactment of the 1988 Act -
HUD has interpreted the Act to apply to disparate impact claims in these
formal adjudications.165 That HUD has propounded an interpretation of the
rule in formal adjudications may provide an independent basis for Chevron
deference,16 6 and in any event, when combined with the rulemaking, pro-
vides a strong basis for deference.
'" See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Ad-
vance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1207 (2011) (describing the 1988 amend-
ments to the Fair Housing Act which strengthened incentives for private enforcement and
created a new administrative enforcement system to allow victims to pursue claims more eas-
ily than through court litigation).
161 See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 73, 85 (1968) (requiring
HUD to investigate, pursue, or dismiss complaints of housing discrimination within thirty days
of filing; if it found a suit meritorious, HUD was required to engage in "conference. concilia-
tion, and persuasion"). The FHA did not allow HUD to litigate claims; HUD had power only
to refer pattern or practice cases or cases "of general public importance" to DOJ. Id.; see
generally Johnson, supra note 160, at 1206-07 (detailing congressional compromises that lim-
ited HUD's powers).
162 See Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 (FHAA), Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3601).
163 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (2006); id. § 3612.
'" See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g), (h); see also 24 C.F.R. § 180.675 (2013).
16s See HUD v. Carter, No. 03-90-0058-1, 1992 WL 406520, at *5 (HUD ALJ May 1,
1992); see also HUD v. Twinbrook Vill. Apartments, No. 02-00-0256-8, 2001 WL 1632533, at
*17 (HUD ALJ Nov. 9, 2001); HUD v. Pfaff, No. 10-93-0084-8, 1994 WL 592199, at *7-9
(HUD ALJ Oct. 27, 1994), rev'don other grounds, 88 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1996); HUD v. Ross,
No. 01-92-0466-8, 1994 WL 326437, at *5, *7 (HUD ALJ July 7, 1994).
'"See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 & n.12 (2001) (stating that Chev-
ron deference is appropriate for "the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication").
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C. HUD's Competence: Regulatory Stability and Uniformity
Beyond HUD's formal capacity to issue rules, HUD's disparate impact
rule, like the agency rules implemented in Title VI and Title VII, must also
be understood with regard to HUD's distinctive duties and capacities in the
FHA's hybrid enforcement regime. HUD's disparate impact rule has the vir-
tue of establishing clarity and uniformity, goals salient to HUD's particular
role in the FHA housing regime.
1. Stability.
HUD's promulgation of a disparate impact rule has the advantage of
formalizing the disparate impact rule as a central part of the fair housing
regime. In promulgating the new rule, HUD stated that it is not creating new
law; the effects standard is longstanding in the circuit courts and consistent
with HUD's interpretation for at least twenty years.167 In addition, HUD
noted that beyond its formal adjudications, it has engaged in administrative
actions that support the impact theory. There is much to support HUD's
characterization of its actions. For example, HUD has issued guidance to
agency staff recognizing disparate impact liability, including a 1993 memo-
randum advising HUD investigators to "analyze complaints under the dispa-
rate impact theory of liability."16  HUD also published "internal guidance"
in 1998 making clear that "occupancy limits may violate the Act's prohibi-
tion of discrimination because of familial status, premised on the application
of disparate impact liability."'6 9 The formal rule takes these informal actions
one step further. It uses regulatory power to formalize these post-1988 ac-
tions to make clear that disparate impact is an explicit part of the fair hous-
ing regime.
2. Clarity.
HUD's statement on its final rule asserts that the rule will eliminate
variation in court standards."o HUD emphasized the variation that has
6' Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11,460, 11,461 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.5, 100.70, 100.120, 100.130,
100.500).
168 Id. (citing Memorandum from the HUD Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing & Equal
Opportunity on The Applicability of Disparate Impact Analysis to Fair Housing Cases (Dec.
17, 1993)). HUD also published similar instructions to fair housing staff in 1995 and 1998.
See id. at 11,462 (citing HUD, TITLE VIII COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION & CONCILIA-
TION HANDBOOK 7-12 (1995); HUD, TITLE VII COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION & CON-
CILIATION HANDBOOK 2-27 (1998)).
169 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 11,462 n.26 (citing Fair Housing Enforcement - Occupancy Standards of Notice of State-
ment of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,256 (Dec. 18, 1998)).
"o See id. at 11,460 (arguing that inconsistency in the burden-shifting analysis "threatens
to create uncertainty as to how parties' conduct will be evaluated").
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arisen among the circuits in applying the disparate impact standard."' HUD
and most federal courts of appeals use the three part burden-shifting ap-
proach. 172 But the Seventh Circuit has used a four-factor balancing test,'73
and the Fourth Circuit uses a four-factor balancing test for public defendants
and a burden-shifting approach for private defendants. 7 4 Another difference
among the circuits and HUD is who bears the burden of proof at the third
stage of the burden-shifting analysis. Five circuits that use the burden-shift-
ing approach place the burden on the plaintiff, but the Second Circuit places
the burden on the defendant. '7 The advantage of the rule then is that it
"establishes uniform clear standards for determining whether a practice that
has a discriminatory effect is in violation of the Fair Housing Act." 76 This
rule, assuming legality under Chevron and given the agency's use of notice-
and-comment rulemaking, will now be controlling in every circuit. 17
Uniformity is of special value given HUD's particular role in the FHA
regime. HUD's adjudicatory function - singular among civil rights agen-
cies - makes uniformity of central importance. Administrative law judges
("ALJs") need to apply a set of horizontally consistent rules within the
agency. But, as ALJs function nationwide, horizontally consistent rules may
be at odds with those operating in particular jurisdictions.
Uniformity is important in the context of the FHA regime for another
reason as well. Beyond HUD's adjudicatory and interpretive role in relation
to the FHA is HUD's broad regulatory relationship to a range of housing
providers and housing-related entities that have found themselves as defend-
ants in housing discrimination cases. HUD provides funding to states and
localities for housing programs, administers loan programs, and provides
mortgage insurance.17 1 Potential defendants, even as they may balk at the
prospect of disparate impact liability under the Act, may prefer a regime in
which the rules are the same across circuits and between circuits and HUD
adjudicators.
171 Id.
72 See, e.g., id. ("This rule formally establishes a three-part burden-shifting test currently
used by HUD and most federal courts . . . ."); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Hunt-
ington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying three-part burden-shifting test), affid in
part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
'7 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977).
174 See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984).
'1 See Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939. HUD ALJs have also applied varying stan-
dards. See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,463 n.37 (citing HUD adjudications).
116 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
at 11,480.
"' See National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005).
178 See Table of Contents, PROGRAMS OF HUD, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=
/hudprograms/toc (last visited Sept. 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.ccl0LqoiYN7KrP (list-
ing programs under HUD's authority). See Johnson, supra note 52, for a discussion of HUD's
role in this regard.
[Vol. 49
The Agency Roots of Disparate Impact
Certainly, HUD's relationship with public and private housing and
mortgage providers has meant that HUD does not consistently advance the
civil rights position."' Indeed, some civil rights groups in recent public
commentary have argued that HUD's disparate impact rule was too weak in
using the language of "legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests" in its bur-
den-shifting framework rather than "business necessity."s 0 Yet, HUD is
charged with both advancing fair housing and working with public and pri-
vate housing and mortgage providers. Creating a clear disparate impact rule
(even if it provokes dissent in both camps) may be consistent with the
agency's particular regulatory role.
CONCLUSION
This Article brings to the fore the role of civil rights agencies in devel-
oping and shaping disparate impact standards in civil rights law. Courts and
commentators have portrayed disparate impact as a questionable offshoot of
antidiscrimination law, which they contend should be focused on disparate
treatment, and have wrung their hands over the difficulties of implementing
this standard in courts. But any analysis of disparate impact should grapple
with the longstanding role agencies have played and might continue to play
in shaping disparate impact rules. While judicial decisions and commentary
often fail to account consistently for agencies' role in developing disparate
impact law, the FHA can now be the location for exploring disparate impact
in light of agencies' formal roles and functional capacity. I have argued that
any evaluation of HUD's capacity must be attentive to the FHA's own spe-
cific regime - one in which the agency has regulatory authority akin to
agencies that administer Title VI, but where the agency has a set of adjudica-
tory powers singular among civil rights agencies.
Acknowledging the agency's role does not mean that one need evaluate
the agency's role as uniformly positive, or declare its competence always
superior to those of courts. Agencies are subject to a set of important con-
straints, including political constraints, and disparate impact is highly con-
tested terrain. From a civil rights perspective, agencies might be viewed
with suspicion given their power to weaken disparate impact rules. Indeed,
agency inefficacy -particularly in the case of HUD and the EEOC - has
17 See CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S
ArrBMPT To DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 144-45 (2006) (placing many of the failures of
housing integration on HUD's "weak institutional home for civil rights"); see also id. at 13-14
(detailing conflicts that arise in an agency like HUD, which has multiple missions - stimulat-
ing housing production but also promoting civil rights goals).
180 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effect Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 11,470. HUD responded that the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest" standard is
equivalent to business necessity, and that HUD chose not to use the latter term "because the
phrase may not be easily understood to cover the full scope of practices covered by the Fair
Housing Act, which applies to individuals, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and public en-
tities." Id.
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historically prompted civil rights litigants to pin their hopes not on agencies,
but on courts.' These, however, are always the constraints that attend the
agency role. And these constraints should not blind us to the traditional
benefits of agency involvement - the power to develop rules and guidance
responsive to a set of specific problems and civil rights goals. In this in-
stance, these powers provide the potential to clarify, formalize, and ulti-
mately stabilize disparate impact law.
181 See generally BONASTIA, supra note 179, at 128 (stating that in the face of HUD's
ineffectiveness in the 1970s, "federal courts would be the primary instigators of change" in
fair housing).
154
